The other panel members concentrated their comments mainly on the question - What happens next? Abbas focused on the victory of the ANP in the NWFP. In 2002, he noted, the elections were rigged in favor of the MMA, the religious coalition, an incident we are now aware of due to a confession from a former Pakistani intelligence (ISI) chief who admitted Musharraf told him to manipulate the polls. This time around, five years later, the MMA failed to show any concrete or tangible changes in the province, and were voted out of power in favor of the ANP, a party that stands for Pashtun nationalism. Abbas was optimistic about the future of the new coalition in the Parliament - since both Nawaz and Asif Zardari have been outside the country for 7-8 years and have "learned quite a bit." Moreover, this new coalition will have no impact on the U.S. led war on terror - since the Pakistani army decides that strategy, not the government.
Rizvi also discussed the future of the U.S.-led war on terror with this new government. According to him, Musharraf's continuation in power will create problems for counterterrorism. Therefore, the only viable solution would be for the president to resign voluntarily. The U.S., Rizvi noted, will face more problems Musharraf stays in power than if he steps down. He asserted that this new government should dialogue with the Islamist extremists (i.e., Beitullah Mehsud, see yesterday's post), and thereby isolate those militants unwilling to cooperate the government. Weinbaum further addressed the U.S. presence in the region, and noted the U.S. government has so far failed to appreciate the transition in process in Pakistan. Musharraf, he added, is increasingly irrelevant as this new government becomes solidified. Weinbaum asserted, "The irony is that every time we try to help Musharraf, we make it worse for him."
The event, all together, was an insightful talk on what should happen next in Pakistan. It seemed based on the questions following the panel talk that people are truly interested in where we should go from here - should a relatively moderate coalition government negotiate with extremist elements in the country? Can forces like Tehreek-e-Taliban be tamed? Moreover, what role does and should the United States play in this process? It is obvious that the U.S. has and will always have a strategic interest in the country - therefore, how can we further this interest and at the same time address the anti-American sentiment raging in the country? A great article in today's LA Times, entitled, "Islamists' Loss in Pakistan isn't a U.S. Win," reported that despite secular party wins in the parliamentary elections, Pakistanis are still unlikely to rally behind the U.S.-led war on terror. The news agency added, "To many Pakistanis, the armed confrontation with Islamic radicals remains 'America's war,' one whose cost in blood has been borne by Pakistani troops with little perceived benefit to this country." As a result, the new parties in power are pushing for a political solution to the problem, rather than the oft-used military solution.
The panel discussion, much like a Magic 8 ball, provided an "Outlook Good" depiction of the country's future - do you agree or is that far too simplistic?